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To interdict dark networks and prevent terrorist attacks, security forces require 
consistent access to relevant intelligence and targeting data. Dark networks often 
react to a security force’s targeting pressure by obscuring their activities and 
becoming increasingly covert. Network adaptation to targeting pressure can 
frequently lead to intelligence gaps and lulls in targeting that may be both predictable 
and preventable if identified early. This study will examine the efficacy of the two 
prevailing modes of targeting and their impact on resilient dark networks. To achieve 
this goal, this thesis will conduct a multivariate path analysis using temporal, 
geospatial, and relational data of a select dark network as these two modes of 
intelligence collection and targeting are employed against the network over time. By 
achieving this goal, this thesis will generate policy recommendations for 
operationalizing the outcomes of this study in order to better formulate how the 
prevailing modes of targeting can more effectively be implemented to address 
adaptive terrorist threats. 
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Following several casualty-producing attacks by a uniquely improvised 
explosive device, a combination of forensic intelligence, national technical means 
(NTM)1 intelligence, and Internet media analysis linked an undisclosed foreign 
terrorist organization to the attacks. While targeting through NTM provided early 
success, over time the membership of this dark network2 conducted denial 
operations3 by modifying their activities and reverting to low technical modes of 
communication4 in order to impede collection efforts by security forces.5 The 
network’s denial operations negatively impacted NTM collection efforts and 
directly reduced available actionable intelligence. Interrogations of captured 
                                            
1 National technical means (NTM) refers to technical intelligence collection (TECHINT), or 
the broad use of technologies rather than the direct use of humans to collect information through 
traditional espionage. Howard O. DeVore, 1999, Jane’s Special Report: China’s Intelligence & 
Internal Security Forces (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group), ch. 7. 
2 “While ‘‘bright’’ and ‘‘dark’’ are metaphors, what we mean empirically is that a bright 
network is legal and visible and a dark network is illegal and tries to be as invisible as possible. 
Visibility refers to the question of how easy activity of a network is to discern without serious 
investigative efforts.” H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems; 
Elements of a Theory,” International Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 334. For the 
purpose of this thesis, we will refer to covert terrorist networks as dark networks.  
3 “Denial refers to activities and programs designed to eliminate, impair, degrade, or 
neutralize the effectiveness of intelligence collection within and across any or all collection 
disciplines, human and technical.” Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: 
Origins, Obstacles and Innovations (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 123.  
4 Forms of low-tech communication can include human intelligence tradecraft practices such 
as dead drops, face-to-face meetings, cut-outs, and unwitting couriers.  
5 For the purpose of this thesis, security forces will refer to law enforcement and military 
forces that are tasked to conduct counterterrorism operations.  
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members of the network detained as a result of early targeting success provided 
only marginal actionable intelligence that ultimately diminished over time.6 
As actionable intelligence deteriorated and the network moved further 
underground, several factors appeared to contribute to the widening intelligence 
gap that prevented successful targeting of the network. The increased 
concealment of the network’s activities and reduction in open communications 
had rendered NTM collection efforts ineffective, while the absence of human 
intelligence (HUMINT)7 source operations directed at the network left security 
forces with few options to reestablish active surveillance of the network. 
Eventually, the deficit in HUMINT source operations and mounting command 
pressure to remedy the intelligence gap led to a frenzy of information 
requirements directed at HUMINT collectors in hopes of penetrating the network. 
Unfortunately, HUMINT requires time to develop and cannot be quickly diverted 
or created where an intelligence gap has previously existed. This suggests that 
an early and persistent emphasis on HUMINT source operations may be required 
to successfully wage long-term counterterrorism operations against dark 
networks.  
While it is apparent that security forces cited in this narrative achieved 
technological dominance, it is equally apparent that they will not always possess 
a technological advantage in the future. What this narrative demonstrates is that 
dark networks are capable of successfully employing denial operations by 
adapting low-tech communication strategies to thwart NTM collection efforts. 
Under these conditions, only the occasional and rare operational security 
                                            
6 The noted decline in actionable intelligence from interrogations can be attributed to the 
diminishing value and time sensitive nature of HUMINT interrogation information over time. Once 
captured, the relevant information a detainee can provide degrades as a detainee’s insurgent 
network modifies their actions and modes of communication to prevent future targeting and 
disruption of the network.  
7 Human intelligence is defined as a category of intelligence derived from information 
collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department 
of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, amended through 2009), 249.  
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(OPSEC) gaffe by dark network members will lead to potential NTM collection 
opportunities. Without these opportunities, the only alternative to rectify this 
intelligence gap and reestablish surveillance of the network is through the 
employment of HUMINT source operations.  
On the other hand, it is also true that HUMINT source operations are 
vulnerable to denial operations through an increase in compartmentalization8 and 
operational security measures. While overcoming HUMINT denial operations is a 
difficult task, the versatility of HUMINT collection can provide a comparatively 
greater menu of collection methods to increase a security forces probability of 
success against dark networks. These can be as simple as elicitation9 or can be 
as elaborate and innovative as the Four Square Laundry Service cover 
businesses used by British Military Intelligence in Northern Ireland to collect 
information on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).10  
Although, the previous narrative demonstrates that sole dependency on 
NTM targeting has significant shortfalls, a fascination and affinity for the 
application of technology in fighting terrorist networks persists. It is no stretch to 
suggest that our dependency on technology has been advanced by our 
perceptions of information dominance in contemporary conventional warfare. 
                                            
8 In a dark network, it is often necessary for security purposes to structurally separate an 
organization down to its most basic structure, a cell. “The cell may be compartmentalized in order 
to protect the underground organization and reduce the vulnerability of its members to capture. 
Compartmentalization restricts the information any member has about the identity, background, 
or current residence of any other cell member. He knows individuals only by their aliases and the 
means by which they can be reached. This follows the underground “fail-safe” principle: if one 
element in the organization fails, the consequences to the total organization will be minimal. 
Furthermore, it is a security measure that protects not only the organization but the individuals in 
the compartmentalized cells.” Department of the Army, Human Factors and Consideration of 
Underground Insurgencies (DA PAM 550-104) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army) 20.  
9 Elicitation (intelligence): Acquisition of information from a person or group in a manner that 
does not disclose the intent of the interview or conversation. A technique of human source 
intelligence collection, generally overt, unless the collector is other than he or she purports to be. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint 
Publication 1-02) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1999, amended through 2009), 183.  
10 Bradley W. C. Bamford, “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland,” 
Intelligence & National Security 20, no. 4 (2005): 588.  
 4 
This sentiment has carried over into modern counterterrorism operations where 
this fascination with technology has skewed our understanding of how best to 
defeat terrorist networks. Our tendency to emphasize and develop a narrow 
focus on the successes of technical intelligence is a dangerous precedent, and 
mirrors how the U.S. has historically underestimated the learning, development, 
and adaptability of militarily weaker enemies as was observed in Vietnam and 
Iraq. This phenomenon is illustrated in Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction 
model, where he demonstrates that weak actors (like dark networks) are capable 
of defeating militarily stronger actors (security forces) by refusing to engage a 
strong actor where they have a strategic advantage. Ivan Arreguín-Toft explains 
that by adopting a strategy (asymmetric) that does not play into the strategic 
advantage of the strong actor, a weaker actor can avoid direct conflict by simply 
waiting until the stronger actor abandons or redirects their focus elsewhere.11 
Despite the lessons of Arreguín-Toft, many analysts continue to place emphasis 
on the employment of technical intelligence in defeating our terrorist adversaries, 
while underplaying the parallel function and strengths of HUMINT source 
operations.  
For example, in Countering the New Terrorism, John Arquilla, David 
Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini assert that because of the human limitations of 
HUMINT, “…it is ill-advised to pin significant hopes on the development of 
sufficient HUMINT sources to wage an effective counterterrorist campaign.”12 In 
Brave New War, John Robb states that the leveraging of technology by terrorists, 
“…has finally reached a point where small super empowered groups, and not yet 
individuals, now have the capability to challenge the state in warfare and win.”13  
                                            
11 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 35.  
12 Ian O. Lesser et al., “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in Countering the 
New Terrorism, ed. John Arquilla et al. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999), 78–79.  
13 John Robb, Brave New War, The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2007), 11.  
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Many leaders and policy makers also dismiss HUMINT on the false 
presumption that NTM intelligence will comparatively increase the degree of 
warning to impending terrorist attacks. However, as Katya Drozdova 
demonstrated in her analysis of al-Qaeda communications and operations, the 
use of high tech communications by al-Qaeda consistently peaked during an 
attack, rather than prior to the attack, making it improbable that NTM intelligence 
could play a significant role in the preventing terrorist attacks by more 
sophisticated terrorist organizations.14  
B. IMPORTANCE 
While the previously cited narrative demonstrates the utility of HUMINT in 
the conduct of counterterrorism campaigns, Western nations in general and the 
United States in particular, continue to gravitate towards technological solutions 
to defeat or prevent terrorist attacks. While there is evidence to support these 
policy prescriptions, it should not be overlooked or dismissed that the most 
sophisticated terrorists we face today have and are capable of conducting denial 
operations that can evade our most technologically advanced modes of 
intelligence collection and targeting for decades. A report released by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
demonstrated that none of the 9/11 al-Qaeda hijackers were known to have 
owned a laptop, desktop computer, or electronic storage media, despite several 
of them arriving in the United States as early as 21 months prior to the attacks. 
The report also stated that the hijackers limited their use of technology and were 
cautious when making and receiving operational communications by using pre-




                                            
14 Katya Drozdova, Analyzing Terrorist Communications: Detecting Early Signals of Attack 
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, 2009), 21.  
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internet cafés. What is more telling is that they reserved their most sensitive 
preparation and planning for three face-to-face meetings that were conducted in 
2001.15  
As James Bamford and Scott Willis’ 2009 documentary The Spy Factory 
illustrates, the precautions taken by the hijackers to reduce their communications 
signature and remain under the radar of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) 
eavesdropping capabilities was savvy enough to be successful.16 Not only did 
the 19 al-Qaeda operatives who conducted the 9/11 attacks practice low tech 
denial operations, but Osama Bin Laden himself evaded U.S. detection for at 
least 14 years through denial operations before his death in May 2011. Author 
Peter Bergen stated in his 2013 book Manhunt, The Ten-Year Search for Bin 
Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad,  
…Bin Laden started avoiding any electronic communications as 
early as 1997, understanding that they could be intercepted. Also, 
al-Qaeda’s leaders had closely followed the April 1996 
assassination of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the Chechen prime minister, 
who was killed by a Russian missile that homed in on the signal 
emitted by his cell phone. At the time, Chechnya was a major focus 
of al-Qaeda’s efforts to foment global jihad.17  
The same pattern of sophisticated operational security and denial 
operations was practiced by the military leader of Hezbollah, Imad Mughniyeh as 
he evaded targeted assassination for 16 years before ultimately being 
assassinated in 2008. With Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah having mastered denial 
operations against the most sophisticated and determined terrorist manhunts in 
recent history, it is imperative that the United States remain vigilant in identifying 
and preventing the low-tech terrorist threat into the immediate future.  
                                            
15 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Report: The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model, 2003, 
http://911workinggroup.org/FBI_FOIA.html  
16 James Bamford, The Spy Factory [television], directed by Scott Willis (Boston; NOVA/The 
Public Broadcasting System, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/spyfactory/credits.html  
17 Peter L. Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad 
(New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2012), Kindle Edition, 85–86.  
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C. KEY TERMS 
In order to build a foundation for the research and theoretical framework of 
this thesis, I will define the properties and terms that directly relate to the 
discussion of the research topic of this study.  
1. Dark and Bright Networks  
H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab differentiate between dark networks and 
bright networks when they state,  
…a bright network is legal and visible and a dark network is illegal 
and tries to be as invisible as possible. Visibility refers to the 
question of how easy activity of a network is to discern without 
serious investigative efforts18 (The spectrum of dark and bright 
networks is illustrated in Figure 1).  
                                            
18 H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems; Elements of a 








Figure 1.  Diagram of Bright and Dark Network Spectrum19 
2. Network Resilience  
Milward and Raab describe resilient dark networks as those confronted 
with environmental pressures20 and who, “…are, in principle, able to adapt their 
structures and behavior or even transform themselves altogether in order to react 
to changing conditions in their environments.”21 However, as dark networks 




                                            
19 Adapted from H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems,” 
International Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 335.  
20 H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab describe network adaptation to environmental pressures as 
the strategic contingent perspective, which is essentially a dark network variation on 
organizational contingency theory.  
21 H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems,” International 
Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 334.  
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with their need for covertness, security, and ultimately survival. Milward and 
Raab argue that in order to be resilient, dark networks must adapt through the 
processes of differentiation and integration.22  
3. Differentiation 
For the purpose of this research, differentiation is defined here as the 
process by which dark networks establish a division of labor in order to replace 
the functional roles of the captured, killed, or disrupted members who once 
fulfilled the network’s organizational goals. This is often a difficult process when 
the network’s need for security and covertness often leads to increased 
compartmentalization. While compartmentalization increases the security of the 
network by restricting information flow between network communication 
structures, it can also restrict highly specialized roles like bomb makers from 
having a direct relationship (tie) with the members of the network who may be 
responsible for emplacing the bomb.  
4. Integration 
For the purpose of this research, integration is defined here as the 
process by which dark networks form linkages between specialized roles and 
operational role counterparts. Through integration, a network establishes 
mechanisms of communication, authority systems, and adherence to common 
goals that provide direction and motivation towards collective action. The more 
specialized roles are, the more reliant other members of the network are on their 
skills, and the more intricate the integration mechanisms that are required to 
achieve collective action.23 A network’s need for integration to achieve collective 
action leads us to a key and related concept of network control. The process of 
                                            
22 H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems,” International 
Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 343.  
23 H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems,” International 
Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 353. 
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integration infers that leaders exert control on network members by 
communicating plans and coordinating efforts to achieve organizational goals.  
5. Network Control 
For the purpose of this research, network control is conceptualized by 
Milward and Raab as consisting of two methods of communication that terrorist 
leaders employ in order to facilitate internal control of dark networks: structure 
and technology. While the foundation of internal network control is derived from 
human proximity and face-to-face communications (structure), technology can 
substitute for human structure and act as a control mechanism under certain 
conditions (the concept of network control is illustrated in Figure 2).24 What the 
principal of network control demonstrates is that the choices of control for dark 
networks are constrained by the mechanisms of technology and human 
structure, and that these mechanisms parallel security forces’ modes of human 
and technical intelligence collection and targeting. Furthermore, the parallels of 
network control and modes of collection and targeting create a basis for strategic 
interaction between security forces and terrorist networks. It is the process of 
strategic interaction and a dark networks tendency to adapt to environmental 
pressure that will form the basis of the theoretical framework for this thesis. 
                                            
24 H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems,” International 
Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 346–347.  
 11 
 
Figure 2.  Diagram of Network Control Strategy25 
6. Social Network Analysis  
As described by de Nooy et al., the purpose of social network analysis is 
to detect and interpret patterns of social ties among actors within a network.26 
The application and measures of social network analysis will be applied in this 
research to map and describe the network and its activities as the network 
responds to the external pressure of security forces.  
7. Interdiction 
For the purpose of this research, the definition of interdiction is modified 
from Joint Publication 3-03 to specifically refer to an action taken by security 
forces to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy a dark network’s capability before it can 
                                            
25 H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems,” International 
Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 346. 
26 Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj. Exploratory Social Network 
Analysis with Pajek, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
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be used against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives.27 Through the 
modes of intelligence collection and targeting researched within this study, 
security forces operationalize actionable intelligence in order to interdict dark 
networks.  
D. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
This purpose of this thesis is to examine the efficacy of the two prevailing 
modes of counterterrorism intelligence collection and targeting and their impact 
on dark network adaptation and resiliency over time. Specifically, it will examine 
the strategic interaction between security forces’ and dark networks and how the 
employment of HUMINT and NTM modes of collection and targeting compel dark 
networks to adapt to environmental pressures. In order for security forces to 
interdict dark networks and prevent terrorist attacks, they require consistent 
access to relevant and often actionable intelligence and targeting data. Despite a 
security force’s inclination to conceal sources and methods of intelligence, dark 
networks often react to targeting pressure by obscuring their activities and 
becoming increasingly covert. Dark network adaptation to targeting pressure can 
frequently lead to intelligence gaps and lulls in effective targeting that may be 
both predictable and preventable if identified early in a counterterrorism 
campaign.  
Ultimately, this thesis’s objectives are to gain a broader understanding of 
the efficacy and application of HUMINT and NTM collection and targeting of dark 
networks. By achieving these objectives, it will generate policy recommendations 
for operationalizing the outcomes of this study in order to better formulate how 
HUMINT and NTM collection and targeting can be implemented to address 
adaptive dark networks. By better understanding the efficacy of each mode’s 
impact on dark network adaptation, security forces will increase their capacity to 
                                            
27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Joint Interdiction (Joint Publication 3-03) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), GL-4.  
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analyze and identify the strategies of dark networks and formulate intelligence 
and targeting strategies that more effectively address the adaptive ability of dark 
networks and minimize intelligence gaps in the future.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the ability of dark networks to adapt to environmental pressures and 
the constrained decisional framework in which they must control the balance of 
covertness and capacity to act, it is crucial to understand how security forces’ 
intelligence collection and targeting efforts can be maximized to most effectively 
address the threat of terrorist networks. While anecdotal evidence indicates a 
capacity for dark networks to deny and evade national technical means (NTM) 
and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and targeting, security forces must 
analyze the efficacy of each source of intelligence in order to determine how they 
may be optimally applied against the adaptation of dark networks. This research 
addresses the question: How can security forces increase the expected utility28 
of HUMINT and NTM intelligence towards interdicting dark networks?  
F. THESIS CHAPTER REVIEW 
Chapter I provides the background and importance of the research topic in 
relation to the contemporary operating environment, defines the key research 
terms, provides the purpose and objectives of the research topic and frames the 
research question that is the basis of this thesis. Chapter II presents the research 
hypothesis, defines the variables, and provides a literature review of the broad 
conceptual and empirical literature as it relates to the theoretical framework of 
this thesis. Chapter III provides a detailed description of the empirical data, 
background and special considerations, method and organization of data 
collection and coding employed in this research, and a detailed description of the 
methods used to test my hypothesis. Chapter IV presents a summary of the 
                                            
28 Von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 10. 
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results, description of the network’s behavior in relation to the modes of 
intelligence collection and targeting, and detailed observations, descriptive 
analysis and results as they relate to the hypothesis. Chapter V concludes the 
thesis by providing a discussion of the key research findings, conclusions, policy 
















II. HYPOTHESIS AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
The primary goal of this chapter is to define the variables that support the 
research hypothesis, present the hypothesis within the conceptual framework of 
the strategic interaction model, and describe the nature of their relationships and 
potential effects between variables. Lastly, this chapter will survey the existing 
body of literature related to the field of intelligence collection and targeting and 
dark network adaptation and resilience in order to identify current research 
perspectives and identify areas where additional contributions can be made 
within this field of study.  
A. DEFINING THE VARIABLES 
In order to control for the contrasting expectations of efficacy for NTM and 
HUMINT targeting of dark networks, this thesis takes a multivariate approach in 
analyzing the stated research question. To achieve this goal, the hypothesis 
identifies several causal mechanisms that explain the relationships between the 
modes of target intelligence collection and the degree of influence that they have 
on successful counterterrorism operations. The hypothesis defines the 
independent variable (IV) as being the type of intelligence collection and 
targeting used by security forces to interdict dark networks. The types of 
intelligence that have been selected for the independent variable are the two 
dominant modes of intelligence collection and targeting: human intelligence 
(HUMINT-IV1) and national technical means (NTM-IV2). Each source of 
intelligence can either serve as a pure or mixed collection and targeting strategy 
when used independently or in tandem. The hypothesis predicts that each source 
of intelligence (HUMINT and NTM) will also serve as an antecedent condition 
when employed as a mixed strategy and under specific conditions.
29
 This means 
that each independent variable serves to magnify the effect of the other 
                                            
29 I will describe how the independent variables will serve as antecedent conditions under 
specific criteria in the theoretical framework.  
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independent variable on the dependent variable when used in tandem. The 
hypothesis defines the intervening variable (IntV) to be a dark network’s 
adaptation to environmental pressure. Dark network adaptation refers to the 
process of identifying environmental pressures and employing the network 
control mechanisms of technology (high-tech) or human structure (low-tech) to 
counter environmental pressure by balancing degrees of security and collective 
action (See network control strategy in Figure 2).
30
 The hypothesis defines 
environmental pressure as the collection and targeting pressure exerted by state 
security forces on a dark network. The dark network’s strategy for adaptation is 
divided into four choices: maintain the status quo (do nothing); employ a mixed 
strategy of high and low-tech communications; employ a pure strategy of high-
tech communications; or employ a pure strategy of low-tech communications. 
Although there were varying measures of network effectiveness (raw interdictions 
or weighted significance of detainees) that could have been used to measure the 
causal relationship between the modes of intelligence collection and targeting, 
this study selected the network performance measure of “attacks per capita” over 
time as the dependent variable (DV) (see path analysis in Figure 3).  
 
                                            
30 Network adaptation under environmental pressure is essentially the use of control 
mechanisms to balance network visibility (covertness) and the capacity to act. Differentiation and 
integration as defined by H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational 
Problems,” International Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006). 
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Figure 3.  Hypothesis and Path Analysis  
1. Independent Variable 1 
HUMINT refers to human intelligence defined as a category of intelligence 
derived from information collected and provided by human sources.31 However, 
human intelligence is a far more diverse intelligence collection tool than policy 
makers and practitioners realize. As Michael Butler describes,  
HUMINT in practice is a multifaceted process—an amalgamation of 







                                            
31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Joint Publication 1-02) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1999, amended through 2009), 
249. 
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recruitment of agents from an adversarial group, recruitment of 
access agents, interrogation, intelligence liaison, and the handling 
of walk-in agents.32  
2. Independent Variable 2 
NTM refers to technical intelligence (TECHINT), or the broad use of 
technologies rather than the direct use of humans to collect information through 
traditional espionage.33 One such type of NTM was detailed in Mark Bowden’s 
book, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw, when he 
described the radio direction-finding equipment used by special Columbian police 
in the search for Pablo Escobar.34  
3. Intervening Variable 
Network adaptation to environmental pressure is essentially the use of 
network control mechanisms to balance network visibility (covertness) and the 
capacity to act.35 For the purpose of this thesis, network adaptation will be 
measured through the social network analysis measure of geospatial degree 
centralization, which will be described in greater detail in the methods section of 
this thesis.  
4. Dependent Variable 
In order to employ a more sophisticated and quantifiable measure of dark 
network performance as it relates to a security force’s intelligence collection and 
targeting (external pressure) of the network, this thesis will use the measure of 
                                            
32 Michael Butler, “Killing Cells: Retooling Human Intelligence Collection for Global 
Decentralized Terrorism,” presented at ISA’s 50th Annual Convention, New York, February 2009, 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p310663_index.html 
33 Howard O. DeVore, 1999, Jane’s Special Report: China’s Intelligence & Internal Security 
Forces (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group), ch. 7. 
34 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York: Atlantic 
Monthly, 2001), 79. 
35 H. B. Milward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems,” International 
Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 346–347. 
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“attacks per capita” as defined by the total number of attacks divided by the total 
number of free network members during the given time period (during the span of 
time that security forces actively collected intelligence and targeted the network).  
B. HYPOTHESIS  
Given the mode of security forces’ intelligence collection and targeting and 
the adaptation of dark networks to environmental pressure, the hypothesis 
should predict the probability of success of counterterrorism operations overtime. 
By employing a strategic interaction model (see Figure 4. below), the hypothesis 
frames the vulnerabilities and strengths of each strategy in order to predict what 
decisions will be made in order to reduce the risk or achieve the greatest benefit 
for each opponent. Similar to Ivan Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s theory of asymmetric 
conflict, a dark network is more likely to create an asymmetric alignment of 
strategies between itself and security forces when it is confronted with a militarily 
stronger opponent.
36
 In other words, a dark network is expected to employ a 
strategy that does not directly play into its opponent’s strengths. This hypothesis 
predicts that a dark network will recognize the origin of environmental pressures 
applied by its opponent and modify its behavior in order to achieve an 
asymmetrical strategy—and consequently greater security.
37
 
                                            
36 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 35. 
37 It is not necessary for a dark network to pinpoint the specific origin or mode of targeting in 
order to create asymmetry. The spectrum of adaptation can range from completely open to 
completely closed organizations, with the latter achieving the greatest security in exchange for 
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Figure 4.  Hypothesis: Strategic Interaction Model38 
This model demonstrates the strategic interaction between a dark network 
and the opposing security forces’ selected mode of targeting (which I establish is 
an environmental pressure) on the network. When a dark network is faced with 
an environmental pressure of high-tech intelligence collection and targeting 
strategy from security forces, the network will choose to modify their behavior to 
a low-tech human control strategy (high-low). The resulting low-tech strategy 
affords the dark network the greatest degree of security and lowest probability of 
detection and interdiction. The dark network achieves greater security in a High-
Low strategic interaction because the security forces’ high-tech strategy is 
incapable of identifying and interdicting a dark network with a low-tech strategy.  
                                            
38 The strategic interaction model demonstrates opposing high and low technological 
strategies for security forces and dark networks. The model predicts a two-organization zero sum 
game. When a low-tech dark network strategy opposes a security forces high technology 
strategy, the hypothesis predicts a (1, 4) outcome with 4 being a winning strategy for the dark 
network and 1 being a losing strategy for security forces.  
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Conversely, if a dark network fails to modify its behavior and instead 
chooses to maintain a high-tech means of control, security forces’ employment of 
a high-tech means of intelligence collection and targeting strategy will result in 
the highest probability of detection and interdiction of the dark network. 
Furthermore, if the dark network and security forces both select a low-tech 
strategy (Low-Low); security forces will maintain a greater potential advantage 
(though slightly degraded from the optimal High-High) over the dark network 
because of the versatile and resilient nature of HUMINT in combination with the 
security forces’ greater material advantage. Finally, if a dark network chooses to 
maintain a high-tech strategy and opposing security forces employ a low-tech 
strategy (Low-High), the security forces are still able to maintain a greater 
potential advantage because HUMINT source operations are capable of 
collecting and targeting a dark network whether or not they employ a 
technological (high-tech) or human structure (low-tech) control mechanism.  
It is important to note that a chosen strategy and an opponent’s counter 
strategy are not necessarily dichotomous in this model, and that mixed strategies 
can be employed with increasing or decreasing degrees of success by both 
opponents. Based on this theoretical model, several inferences can be made in 
relation to mixed strategies by security forces. First, because a security forces’ 
low-tech strategy can be employed in some degree across any control 
mechanism a dark network employs (high or low-tech), it can be reasoned that 
establishing a threshold of HUMINT in all quadrants would be beneficial to 
security forces. Second, since a high-tech strategy by security forces can only be 
effective against a dark networks high-tech strategy, it can be hypothesized that 
a high and low-tech mixed strategy against a dark networks high-tech strategy 
would increase the effectiveness of collection and targeting if collection is not 
wholly redundant.39 Since I have established that a security forces’ low-tech 
                                            
39 Even if collection is redundant, the information gleaned would provide greater clarity to 
decision makers on matters of targeting (i.e., all-source intelligence collection). 
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strategy can be employed in varying degrees of success across any network 
control strategy (High or Low-Tech), the inclusion of a high-tech strategy would 
serve as an antecedent condition capable of increasing the success of HUMINT 
(low-tech) driven network interdictions (High*Low versus High). The same 
inference of mixed strategy antecedent condition cannot be made when a dark 
network employs a low-tech strategy because a security forces’ high-tech 
strategy has no antecedent relationship with a low-tech strategy under these 
conditions. The only other option available is for a dark network to employ a 
mixed strategy of their own, in which case, a mixed strategy by security forces 
would maintain a greater potential advantage because of the antecedent 
condition and greater material advantage (High*Low versus High+Low). The 
strategic interaction that frames this theoretical framework is represented in 
Figure 4. 
As security forces continue to target terrorist networks with a 
predisposition for technical intelligence collection, security forces run the risk of 
generating intelligence gaps that are both predictable and preventable. While the 
sophistication and adaptability of the dark networks that will be examined in this 
narrative are not the norm, they do represent a dark network’s most dangerous 
course of action against security forces and non-combatant populations. It is 
because of this danger that it is important that security forces understand the 
strategic interaction between intelligence collection and targeting and dark 
network adaptation to environmental pressures. The better security forces 
understand these dynamics, the more effectively they can apportion intelligence 
collection assets against emerging threats and better generalize the principles of 
this study in future counterterrorism campaigns.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This literature review seeks to achieve four objectives. First, it surveys the 
relevant historical body of literature related to research focused on the mode of 
human intelligence collection and targeting. Second, it examines literature related 
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to research focused on the mode of national technical means intelligence 
collection and targeting. Third, it explores literature related to research focused 
on dark network adaptation and resilience to external pressure. Finally, it 
summarizes the significance and implications of this review for my hypothesis. It 
is not intended to be fully comprehensive, but rather descriptive of the current 
state of research in this field of study.  
In order to separate the opposing perspectives on the efficacy of low and 
high technological counterterrorism intelligence collection and targeting, I have 
extracted the principal intelligence collection themes from each work within the 
greater body of literature. While a number of works within this body of literature 
advocate all-source collection as the primary mode of targeting, a deeper 
examination of these works reveals a predisposition for one mode of targeting 
over the other. I have also included intelligence collection works focusing on 
counter-insurgency doctrine, as the two fields are closely related when reduced 
down to the effective modes of targeting for both strategies. While 
counterinsurgency deals with the application of grand strategy, counterterrorism 
is more narrowly focused on the related counterinsurgency tactic or strategy 
subset of countering or suppressing terrorist actions against security forces and 
or a non-combatant population. Finally, this review will briefly explore several 
perspectives on war in the information age and its significance in understanding 
how dark network’s communicate, adapt, and survive when confronted with 
external pressure.  
1. Human Intelligence and Targeting 
A review of the historical body of literature pertaining to human intelligence 
(HUMINT) collection and targeting demonstrates that while numerous academics 
and intelligence analysts have long praised the impact of HUMINT on 
counterterrorism operations, there is still an organizational aversion by many 
U.S. intelligence officers and senior military leaders to prioritize HUMINT as the  
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primary collection and targeting platform for interdicting terrorists. Retired Air 
Force Colonel Steven O’Hern has explained why this cultural bias is prevalent in 
the military intelligence community: 
There are several reasons why leaders of military intelligence 
organizations favor technical intelligence. Officers who rise to 
become general officers within military intelligence organizations 
nearly all arise from backgrounds that involve technical intelligence 
gathering, including collecting and analyzing electronic signals such 
as radio communications and supervising satellites and 
reconnaissance aircraft and the analysis of the images they 
produce.40  
Despite O’Hern’s anecdotal evidence of organizational bias favoring 
technical intelligence within the U.S. military intelligence community, there are 
also several tangible reasons why this attitude persists. HUMINT admittedly has 
its faults and those shortcomings often color the perceptions of commanders who 
strongly prefer NTM intelligence because of its perceived reduced susceptibility 
to human influence and error. With increasing emphasis by senior military 
leaders to expand and develop U.S. military’s cyber operations and security 
capabilities, existing organizational bias towards NTM intelligence will likely 
persist into the immediate and long-term future. However, O’Hern provides 
critical insight into the rationale of military decision makers and analysts who are 
responsible for developing counterterrorism intelligence collection and targeting 
plans. By understanding these organizational perspectives, policy prescriptions 
can be more effectively formulated and presented to address these known biases 
and concerns.  
In Katya Drozdova and Michael Samoilov’s 20101 study of al Qaeda 
communications, they develop a predictive analysis model for detecting the 
traceability of both high-tech and low-tech terrorist communications in order to 
prevent future terrorist attacks. Their findings provide a foundation for the 
                                            
40 Steven K. O’Hern, The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 2008), 119.  
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proposed causal framework (strategic interaction model) of this thesis, enhance 
the understanding of dark network vulnerabilities in relation to network 
communication choices, and provide a contextual understanding of how dark 
networks adapt their modes of communication to increase resilience. First, they 
describe actions taken by dark networks to reduce structural network 
vulnerabilities through their chosen modes of communication, leading them to 
conclude that:  
Modern hi-tech devices create electronic traces of organizational 
activity. Monitoring these traces improves opponent’s knowledge of 
the FINO,41 increasing its risk of detection and damage from 
counteraction. Alternatively, low-tech choices leave physical or 
social traces that may be difficult to follow in a timely manner—if at 
all—thus effectively concealing information about FINO 
vulnerabilities.42 
Their findings assert that a dark network’s use of high-tech 
communications increases its vulnerability to NTM intelligence collection and 
targeting, while the use of low-tech communications reduces structural network 
vulnerabilities to NTM and makes it more resilient overtime. They reason that 
external network pressure (shock) compels dark networks to decentralize and 
minimize their traceability in order to limit network damage and provide time and 
space for recovery.43 This suggests that the effectiveness of NTM intelligence 
collection and targeting diminishes over time as dark networks adapt to external 
pressure.  
                                            
41 FINO is described by Drozdova and Samoilov as failure or fault-intolerant network 
organizations, which are networks where the loss of a single node could result in catastrophic 
failure of the network.  
42 Katya Drozdova and Michael S. Samoilov, “Predictive Analysis of Concealed Social 
Network Activities Based on Communication Technology Choices: Early-Warning Detection of 
Attack Signals from Terrorist Organizations,” Computational and Mathematical Organization 
Theory 16 (2010): 67, DOI: 10.1007/s10588-009-9058-2.  
43 Katya Drozdova and Michael S. Samoilov, “Predictive Analysis of Concealed Social 
Network Activities Based on Communication Technology Choices: Early-Warning Detection of 
Attack Signals from Terrorist Organizations,” Computational and Mathematical Organization 
Theory 16 (2010): 66, DOI: 10.1007/s10588-009-9058-2. 
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Another key finding in this study concludes that low-tech signals (spikes in 
behavior that differ from normal baseline behavior) consistently occur prior to 
attacks, providing an early warning, while a similar analysis of high-tech 
communication signals does not produce a traceable signal to assist security 
forces in preventing attacks.44 These findings are significant to my hypothesis in 
that they parallel a dark network’s communication strategy in relation to a 
security forces mode of intelligence collection and targeting. Although the study 
indirectly advocates for a security forces use of HUMINT collection and targeting 
against dark networks, the final policy recommendations advocate for a multi-
source (all-source intelligence) data approach for detecting low-tech and high-
tech signals in order to predict and prevent future terrorist attacks.  
In Michael Butler’s 2004 paper on retooling human intelligence for global 
decentralized terrorism, he proposes a change from what he coins the current 
recruitment-centered model (RCM) of HUMINT collection to a more threat 
identification-centered model (TICM) of HUMINT collection.45 Although the 
purpose of his paper is to provide policy prescriptions for changing the outdated 
Cold War model of HUMINT collection to a more threat centric model for 
counterterrorism, many of Butler’s policy prescriptions are still germane to this 
thesis. The significance of his research and recommendations to this thesis is the 
TICM’s application to decentralized dark networks and the broad menu of options 
presented within the mode of HUMINT collection and targeting. Butler specifically 
focuses on developing a threat centric collection plan that primarily recruits a 
network of access agents to map terrorist network(s) and provide opportunities 
for employing the additional options of intelligence liaison, unilateral network 
                                            
44 Katya Drozdova and Michael S. Samoilov, “Predictive Analysis of Concealed Social 
Network Activities Based on Communication Technology Choices: Early-Warning Detection of 
Attack Signals from Terrorist Organizations,” Computational and Mathematical Organization 
Theory 16 (2010): 81, DOI: 10.1007/s10588-009-9058-2. 
45 Michael Butler, “Killing Cells: Retooling Human Intelligence Collection for Global 
Decentralized Terrorism,” paper presented at ISA’s 50th Annual Convention, New York Marriott 
Marquis, New York, February 2009, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p310663_index.html 
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penetration, terrorist walk-ins, interrogations, and direct recruitment of terrorists 
for network penetration. Most importantly, Butler’s policy prescriptions provide a 
basis for formulating HUMINT collection and targeting options within broader all-
source intelligence strategy, and provide a menu of relevant recommendations 
that can be applied to the results and findings of my thesis.  
2. National Technical Means Intel and Targeting 
A review of the historical body of literature pertaining to national technical 
means (NTM) intelligence collection and targeting indicates a developed 
research focus on the growing technological savviness of ordinary individuals 
and their ability to leverage technology to achieve a comparative advantage over 
the state security apparatus. In his book, Brave New War, John Robb states that 
the leveraging of technology by terrorists, “…has finally reached a point where 
small super empowered groups, and not yet individuals, now have the capability 
to challenge the state in warfare and win.”46 Robb is an advocate of fourth 
generation warfare (4GW), which has been deemed by some scholars 
(Echevarria, 2005)47 to be a rebranding of insurgency doctrine. He contrasts with 
traditional 4GW decentralized warfare advocates in his use of technology and the 
information age as an antecedent condition for achieving decentralized collective 
action (attacks). He sees globalization and the transference of technology as 
empowering individuals and ideologues to join dark networks and enabling them 
to coordinate attacks and rapidly adapt to changes in tactics and strategies of the 
state security apparatus.  
Robb’s 4GW perspective is likely influenced by Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s 
research on netwar and swarming phenomena observed in decentralized 
                                            
46 John Robb, Brave New War, The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2007), 311. 
47 Antulio Joseph Echevarria, Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005). 
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warfare.48 This perspective is not unlike the actions of flash mobs where 
disparate individuals organized through social media suddenly swarm public 
locations in order to achieve an innocuous act of collective action and then 
disappear as quickly as they appeared. More deleterious examples of this 
phenomenon have been observed in the online homegrown self-radicalization of 
terrorists similar to the alleged activities of the Tsarnaev brothers prior to the 
Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013.  
Although technology has enabled highly decentralized dark networks to 
train, coordinate, and achieve collective action, these networks are not immune 
to detection or surveillance. While technological dominance of state security 
forces ebbs and flows, there are strong indications that both centralized and 
decentralized dark networks are still vulnerable to intelligence collection and 
targeting. Recent indictments by the U.S. Department of Justice of Chinese 
military hackers conducting elicit hacking of U.S. businesses49 and the 
publication of Mandiant’s exposé (February 2013)50 on the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) hacking unit 61398 demonstrates that even the world’s 
most centralized, sophisticated, and technologically advanced hackers are 
vulnerable to intelligence collection and targeting. Similarly, recent arrests by the 
FBI of 90 hackers across 19 different countries associated with illegal and 
malicious activity using Blackshades remote malware demonstrates that even 
highly geospatially decentralized networks can be surveilled and interdicted 
across international boundaries.51  
                                            
48 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Swarming & the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2000). 
49 Ashley Fantz, “Chinese Hackers Infiltrated U.S. Companies, Attorney General Says,” 
CNN, May 19, 2014, http://m.cnn.com/primary/wk_article?articleId=cnn/2014/05/19/justice/china-
hacking-charges&branding=&category=cnnd_latest&pagesize=10.  
50 Mandiant, APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units (Alexandria, VA: 
Mandiant, 2013).  
51 Evan Perez, “More than 90 People Nabbed in Global Hacker Crackdown,” CNN, May 19, 
2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/19/justice/us-global-hacker-crackdown/.  
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Jennifer Sims’s study on intelligence and counterterrorism advocates for a 
“constructively redundant” method of all-source collection and targeting for 
counterterrorism operations. Although she focuses on the application of multiple 
sources of intelligence, her conclusions indicate that her focus on rapid response 
and technology in counterterrorism operations is indicative of an unintentional 
organizational bias towards NTM.52 This bias is further evidenced throughout her 
study with examples of terrorist technological communications countered by a 
baseline of NTM collection with OSINT and HUMINT only serving as enablers or 
‘additional’ sources for intelligence corroboration. Although it is important to 
respond quickly to terrorist threats in order to prevent attacks, research 
conducted by Katya Drozdova demonstrates that the application of HUMINT and 
not NTM is a more effective source of intelligence for preventing terrorist attacks 
conducted by sophisticated dark networks.53  
However, the most relevant element of Sims’s research to my thesis is her 
observation on the effectiveness of the modes of intelligence collection and 
targeting in relation to decisions and actions of dark networks. Her observations 
provide a construct for explaining the strategic interaction between a security 
forces mode of intelligence collection and targeting and a dark network’s mode of 
communication (network control structure). She describes the degree of 
effectiveness of the modes of intelligence collection and targeting as:  
The productivity of any of these collectors against a particular target 
will depend on that collector’s access to the target’s most 
vulnerable point. For example, if a network of spies uses wireless 
radios, picking up their electronic emissions (TECHINT) will be an 
effective way to find them; if they use couriers, human agents 
secretly opening the letters and packages (HUMINT) is likely to 
work best; if the adversary believes he is unobserved, collecting the 
                                            
52 Jennifer Sims, “Intelligence to Counter Terror: The Importance of All-Source Fusion,” 
Intelligence and National Security, 22, no. 1 (2007): 38–56. 
53 Katya Drozdova, Analyzing Terrorist Communications: Detecting Early Signals of Attack 
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, 2009), 21. 
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names of those he visits from a phone book or the sites he visits 
while traveling as an ostensible tourist (OSINT) would be useful.54  
In summary, Sims’s observation not only enforce the strategic interaction 
model within my hypothesis, it also provides a framework for formulating all-
source policy prescriptions for developing more effective intelligence collection 
plan that is focused on a dark network’s mode(s) of communication (network 
control structure).  
Jackson et al.’s study on terrorist’s counter-technology strategies provides 
a basis for understanding terrorist denial strategies against a state security 
forces’ technology based counterterrorism efforts.55 They establish that most 
counterterrorism technologies are degraded by counter-technology strategies 
over time. They also address how terrorist organizations adapt to technologies by 
“…altering operational practices, making technological changes or substitutions, 
avoiding the defensive technology, and attacking the defensive technology.”56 
Their findings re-enforce the hypothesis that the effectiveness of NTM collection 
and targeting of dark networks erodes over time. Specifically, every terrorist 
organization they analyzed (JI, LTTE, PIRA, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad) 
focused counter-technology strategies on avoiding specific modes of high-tech 
communication in order to negate intelligence collection and targeting. They also 
determined that by continuing to employ technical intelligence collection and 
targeting, security forces compel dark networks to continually employ counter 
strategies to avoid technical intelligence collection-increasing the network’s 
operational risk. 
                                            
54 Jennifer Sims, “Intelligence to Counter Terror: The Importance of All-Source Fusion,” 
Intelligence and National Security, 22, no. 1 (2007): 42.  
55 Brian A. Jackson et al., Breaching the Fortress Wall Understanding Terrorist Efforts to 
Overcome Defensive Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), 132.  
56 Brian A. Jackson et al., Breaching the Fortress Wall Understanding Terrorist Efforts to 
Overcome Defensive Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), 116.  
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3. Dark Network Change and Resilience  
The final body of literature relevant to this thesis is research focused on 
the characteristics and dynamics of dark network change and resilience. In order 
to develop a qualitative understanding of network resiliency to assist in the 
modeling of this study’s dark network data set, it is important to develop an 
understanding of what renders dark networks resilient to exogenous and 
endogenous pressure (shock). Bakker, Raab, and Milward57 propose a 
comprehensive theory of why some dark networks demonstrate greater resiliency 
than others. By conducting a with-in and cross-case analysis of three dark 
network data sets (Unkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia (FARC)), they 
develop a framework of networked capabilities (replacing actors, linkages, and 
balancing integration and differentiation) and network characteristics (resources 
and legitimacy) that contribute to network resiliency and increased operational 
activity (network performance).58 Their findings re-enforce existing research on 
network topology and resilience by identifying network centralization and 
motivation as moderating variables that impact resiliency. They conclude that 
highly centralized networks magnify the effect of shock to a network’s legitimacy 
and resources, while more decentralized networks are more effectively structured 
to mitigate the impact of shock. Furthermore, they argue that network motivation 
influences network resilience through the recruitment of new members and the 
replacement of nodes and linkages. Networks motivated by grievances are more 
likely to be impacted by changes in legitimacy, while networks motivated by 
greed were likely to be impacted by changes in resources. In summary, Bakker, 
Raab, and Milward provide an excellent contextual framework for interpreting  
 
                                            
57 René M Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark 
Network Resilience,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31, no. 1 (2012): 33–62. 
58 René M Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark 
Network Resilience,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31, no. 1 (2012): 33–62.  
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analytic results related to network resilience and performance and offer several 
potential approaches for measuring the effects on the dependent variable of my 
hypothesis.  
One of the infrequently researched areas in the analysis of dark network 
resilience and change has been the use longitudinal analysis to better 
understand how dark networks change over time. Specifically, very few studies 
have analyzed how dark networks adapt in a hostile environment to the 
exogenous pressure (shock) of security forces intelligence collection, targeting 
and interdiction. The absence of research in this area has been largely due to 
sparse longitudinal data on dark networks. However, a 2011 study by Everton 
and Cunningham employs longitudinal analysis to examine the Noordin Top 
terrorist network, providing insight into dark network adaptation, effectiveness 
and performance over time.59 Using descriptive statistics, multivariate regression, 
and topographic metrics (density, centralization, and fragmentation) to examine 
the Noordin Top network, they arrived at several conclusions relevant to this 
thesis. They determined that the Noordin Top network became increasingly 
dense (average degree) during times of increased exogenous pressure (shock) 
or concern for security and decreased as the network reduced its operational 
activities. Additionally, the network became increasingly centralized as it planned 
and conducted high profile attacks. This network behavior is consistent with 
previous research that indicates dark networks occasionally adopt fault-intolerant 
network organizational (FINO) structures (i.e., increasing centralization) when 
planning and executing attacks. Drozdova and Samoilov attribute this decision to 
a cost-benefit analysis that prioritizes the success of the mission over the survival 
of operational nodes.60 This increased centralization may also explain why the 
                                            
59 Sean F. Everton and Dan Cunningham, “Terrorist Network Adaptation to a Changing 
Environment” in Crime and Networks, ed. Carlo Morselli (New York: Routledge, 2011), 287–308. 
60 Katya Drozdova and Michael S. Samoilov, “Predictive Analysis of Concealed Social 
Network Activities Based on Communication Technology Choices: Early-Warning Detection of 
Attack Signals from Terrorist Organizations,” Computational and Mathematical Organization 
Theory 16 (2010): 66, DOI: 10.1007/s10588-009-9058-2. 
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Noordin Top network became increasing fault-intolerant (vulnerable) over time 
and ultimately collapsed following the death of Top in September 2009. Finally, 
topographic fragmentation metrics indicated that the network became 
increasingly cohesive (low fragmentation) during times of high operational activity 
and became increasingly fragmented following successful counterterrorism 
operations against the network. The findings of this study provide a foundation 
for interpreting the results and analysis of the longitudinal data set of this thesis 
and offer a preliminary model for formulating the path analysis that will be used to 
test my hypothesis.  
4. Literature Review Conclusions 
An examination of the existing literature found that there are three key 
points of analysis absent in relation to my hypotheses. First, the balance of 
existing literature lacks any relevant study of the causal relationship between the 
mode of targeting, the intervening variable of network adaptation to 
environmental pressure (shock),61 and the predicted interaction and subsequent 
causation that these two variables have on varying measures of dark network 
performance over time.  
Secondly, while a great number of COIN and counterterrorism intelligence 
related literature emphasizes HUMINT, only a small percentage of these works 
address the decision framework of terrorist networks in response to security force 
intelligence collection and targeting efforts. Of the small percentage of works that 
examine the strategic interaction between terrorists and the environmental 
pressures of intelligence collection and targeting, none advance these ideas 
beyond simple recognition of the phenomena into a more useful empirical 
analysis for improving intelligence collection strategies.  
                                            
61 The strategic interaction between dark networks and security forces is similar to Strategic 
Contingency Perspective in the field of organizational theory and design. H. B. Milward and Jörg 
Raab, “Dark Networks as Problems,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 13, 
no. 4 (2003): 415.  
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Finally, nearly all of the existing literature related to intelligence collection 
and targeting in some degree advocates one source of intelligence over the 
other, but there has been no examination of the scale of intelligence collection 
required to sustain successful counterterrorism operations over time. This 
analytic void begs the question of how much intelligence collection (HUMINT or 
NTM) is necessary to achieve a threshold62 of collection capable of adapting and 
overcoming predictable intelligence gaps.  
                                            
62 While collection efforts are determined by the anatomy of the environment and terrorist 
organization, there are clearly levels of collection that must be achieved in order prevent future 
intelligence gaps. An intelligence collection infrastructure must be flexible enough to detect 
emerging threats and provide sufficient actionable intelligence to provide security forces the time 
and space to establish effective collection efforts against those threats.  
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III. DATA AND METHODS 
A. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The anonymized terrorist network data used for this study was generated 
by multiple government organizations over a period of 27 months. This network 
was selected due its sophistication, advanced tradecraft, and resilience to 
security force’s targeting. Temporal, geospatial, and relational data were 
aggregated from all known free, killed, or captured members of the network. The 
total number of network members was determined to be 409 at the time of coding 
with 40 of those members having been identified as senior leadership within the 
network.  
The raw unstructured data collected consisted of all-source intelligence 
analysis reports, significant activity reports (SIGACTs), interrogation reports, 
targeting databases, human intelligence reports, technical intelligence reports, 
and forensic reports related to forensic attack analysis. Human intelligence 
reports from detainees and human source operations were analyzed to 
compliment and validate the network’s raw data and provide a greater qualitative 
understanding of the network’s adaptation to environmental pressures and the 
degree of intelligence tradecraft it employed to evade targeting by security 
forces. 
The scope and richness of data used in this study provided an excellent 
opportunity for exploring network structure across relational, geospatial, and 
temporal boundaries. Observations on the security forces’ pressure on the 
network (raids, interdictions, modes of intelligence used) and the dark network’s 
activities and responses to exogenous pressure (attacks, disposition, and modes 
of communications used) provided an excellent opportunity to test the strategic 
interaction model and identify the magnitude of performance and resiliency 
observed in the dark network. Although, relational ties were aggregated on all 
409 members, the relatively small number (40) of senior leadership nodes and 
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observed HUMINT driven interdictions (9) posed some challenges in the 
application of statistical analysis and significance measures when conducting 
path analysis. These issues are addressed in further detail in the methods 
portion of this chapter.  
1. DOCUMENT ANALYSIS AND DATA CODING  
a. Document Analysis 
Because of the extensive scope and nature of available data for this study, 
the method of document analysis was employed to review all available 
intelligence reporting and analytic products related to the observed network and 
security force’s activities. Document analysis was selected as a method to 
complement and corroborate the quantitative methods utilized in this study. From 
the base of information established through document analysis, I was able to 
increase the validity, granularity, and contextual understanding of the quantitative 
results and findings. Glenn Bowen63 defines the method of document analysis 
as:  
…a systemic procedure of reviewing or evaluating documents-both 
printed and electronic (computer-based and internet-transmitted) 
material. Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, 
document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted 
in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop 
empirical knowledge.64  
Although some of the limitations of document analysis are derived from 




                                            
63 Glenn Bowen, “Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method,” Qualitative 
Research Journal 9, no.2 (2009): 27–40.  
64 Glenn Bowen, “Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method,” Qualitative 
Research Journal 9, no.2 (2009): 28.  
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available intelligence and operational reporting and analytic products of the 
observed network in order to reduce potential bias and increase the 
triangulation65 of the analytic methods of this study.  
b. Data Coding 
In order to develop structured quantitative data from a host of unstructured 
(raw) intelligence and targeting documents analyzed in this study, content 
analysis (quantitative extension of document analysis)66 was used to code all 
documents along the themes and variables relevant to my hypothesis. Data 
coding is described by Gough and Scott as a method to:  
…organize, manage, and retrieve the most meaningful bits of our 
data. The usual way of going about this is by assigning tags or 
labels to the data, based on our concepts. Essentially, what we are 
doing in these instances is condensing the bulk of our data sets into 
analyzable units by creating categories with and from our data.67 
Content analysis coding was achieved using the Palantir software 
program through the process of tagging (structuring) available intelligence and 
targeting reports selected during document analysis. Special care was taken to 
establish standards for coding objects, properties, and relationships in order to 
not bias the data from inconsistent coding. Since Palantir had already been used 
to code and analyze data from previous terrorist organization data sets, the 
existing ontology provided an excellent foundation to code the observed network. 
                                            
65 Triangulation is defined as, “a process that uses multiple data sources, data collection 
methods, and or theories to validate research findings, help eliminate bias, and detect errors or 
anomalies in discoveries” By employing methodological triangulation, this study corroborated 
different sources of data and increased the overall validity of the findings and recommendations. 
Charles Lusthaus, Organizational Assessment: A Framework for Improving Performance (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2002), 190. 
66 Glenn Bowen, “Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method,” Qualitative 
Research Journal 9, no.2 (2009): 28. 
67 Stephen Gough and William Scott, “Exploring the Purposes of Qualitative Data Coding in 
Educational Enquiry: Insights from recent research,” Educational Studies 26, no.3, (2000): 339–
354, DOI: 10.1080/0305569005013714 
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The existing ontology was only slightly modified to account for unique properties 
and events associated with the observed network. I was able to map the network 
and structure rich one-mode and two-mode data sets covering a wide range of 
object properties and relationships (attributes and affiliations), as well as link and 
geocode individual members to network activities (capture, kill, attacks, 
meetings, etc.). Additionally, security forces’ activities were coded to provide 
geocoded and temporally categorized data for targeted raids. The mode(s) of 
intelligence collection and targeting was also included and was ultimately linked 
to the specific members of the network who were captured or killed. Once the 
structured data coding and network visualization were completed in Palantir,68 
the structured social network data was exported into Organizational Risk 
Analyzer (ORA)69 in order to generate both longitudinal and spatial observations 
of the network as well as conduct analysis.   
2. Data Sources  
a. All-Source Intelligence Analysis Reports 
All-source intelligence reports provided a holistic understanding of the 
network’s leadership, activities (attacks, etc.), motivations, resources (funding 
activities), communications, and capabilities (tradecraft, denial capacity). This 
information was updated regularly in order to provide the most up-to-date picture 
of the network to other analysts and decision makers. These documents were the 
result of multiple analysts across multiple intelligence disciplines working 
together to provide the most comprehensive picture of the network as possible.  
                                            
68 Palantir Technologies Software, can be purchased for use from the Palantir government 
website: http://www.palantirtech.com/government. 
69 ORA (Carley 2001-2011) can be downloaded for free for noncommercial use from the 
ORA website: http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/.  
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b. Significant Activity Reports 
Significant activity (SIGACT) reports used for this research were published 
regularly by security forces during the 27 months the network was observed for 
this study. They included a detailed snapshot of hostile attacks against the 
government, security forces and non-combatants. A SIGACT snapshot included 
the: who, what, when, where, and why (5Ws) of attacks related to bombings, 
small arms attacks, mortar, and rocket attacks. If a group (dark network) claimed 
responsibility for an attack or the attack had an easily recognizable operational or 
forensic signature of a specific network, that information was normally included in 
the report as well.  
c. Interrogation Reports 
Interrogation reports used for this study included information related to 
interrogations of enemy prisoners of war. These provided standard demographic 
information of the detainee as stipulated in the NATO standardization agreement 
(STANAG 2033). They also included details about the date, time, location, and 
circumstances of capture, time of report, capturing unit, date of birth, place of 
birth, nationality, detainee number, languages, marital status, documents and 
equipment on detainee when captured, physical condition, job, mental condition, 
education, experience, information gathered during the interrogation session, and 
an evaluation of the reliability of information provided. Finally, the reports 
provided information related to family members and known associates.  
d. Targeting Databases 
Targeting databases used for this study included information about past, 
present, and current members of dark networks within the security forces’ area of 
operations. These databases provided information about the position (leadership, 
courier, logistician, financier, bomb maker, etc.) that each targeted member held 
within the network (if known), known connections (ties), family members (if 
known), and where the individual was last reported to be located at the time of 
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the report. If captured, these databases included the mode of intelligence used in 
the capture, as well as the time and location of capture. Finally, uncaptured 
members within the database were prioritized based on their targeting 
importance, which was often subjectively assigned at the direction of 
commanders and decision makers. The information in these reports were 
updated weekly, which allowed for security forces to conduct trend analysis and 
identify significant movement of network members from one week to the next.  
e. HUMINT Reports 
Human intelligence reports (intelligence information reports (IIR)) included 
in this study were derived from human intelligence sources and used to report 
HUMINT information in response to command directed collection requirements. 
This information provided context and information related to the network’s 
activities, relationships, ties, leadership, motivations, intentions, finances, 
resources, composition, disposition, communications, and capabilities (not wholly 
inclusive). Each report also included the reliability of the human source of 
information so that individuals using the report could determine the reliability of 
the source of information. 
f. TECHINT Reports 
Technical intelligence (TECHINT) reports included in this study were 
derived from technical intelligence sources (NTM) and used to report information 
in response to command directed collection requirements. TECHNIT reports 
primarily provide information related to the network’s activities, composition, 
disposition, communications, and capabilities (not wholly inclusive). TECHINT 
reports typically included analytic comments as a result of the difficulty in 
discerning intent from technical intelligence reporting.  
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g. Forensic Reports 
Forensic reports used in this research provided information gathered, 
exploited and analyzed from attacks or recovered enemy weapons (bombs, 
IEDs, mortars, small arms, etc.) that provided specific forensic signatures 
(biometric, DNA, etc.) that tied specific attacks to dark networks. They typically 
included the date, time, and location of the attack or capture of enemy weapons, 
known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the enemy network, as well 
as any network members that were biometrically or genetically (DNA) tied to an 
attack. They also often included analytic comments to provide greater context of 
the exploited and analyzed materials identified in the report.  
B. ANALYTIC METHODS 
Many noteworthy and respected studies have conducted research on 
terrorist and insurgent groups (dark networks) using quantitative methods in 
order to better understand and predict organizational behavior. Many of the 
successful quantitative methods used include regression analysis (Everton and 
Cunningham70), structural equation modeling and path analysis (Friedkin71), as 
well as spatial, longitudinal, and relation analysis of dark networks (Krebs 2001; 
Bakker, Raab, Milward;72 Everton and Cunningham73). Due to the numerous 
antecedent conditions and multivariate nature of my hypothesis, I selected a 
quantitative methods approach to test the magnitude and strength of direct and 
indirect relationships between my independent variables (HUMINT & NTM), 
                                            
70 Sean F. Everton and Dan Cunningham, “Terrorist Network Adaptation to a Changing 
Environment” in Crime and Networks, ed. Carlo Morselli (New York: Routledge, 2011), 287–308. 
71 N. E. Friedkin, “Social Networks in Structural Equation Models,” Social Psychology 
Quarterly 53 (2001).  
72 René M Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark 
Network Resilience,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31, no. 1 (2012): 33–62. 
73 Sean F. Everton and Dan Cunningham, “Terrorist Network Adaptation to a Changing 
Environment” in Crime and Networks, ed. Carlo Morselli (New York: Routledge, 2011), 287–308. 
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intervening variable (Network Adaptation: Spatial Degree Centralization), and 
dependent variable (Network Performance: Attacks Per Capita).  
1. Analytic Methods Workflow  
The purpose of this section is to summarize the workflow of analytic 
methods used to test my hypothesis (see data and methods diagram in Figure 6). 
It provides a summary of the spatiotemporal network analysis, social network 
analysis, and statistical analysis (multiple linear regression, structural equation 
modeling, and path analysis) methods used in this thesis.  
 
Figure 5.  Data and Methods Diagram 
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a. Spatiotemporal Network Analysis in ORA 
Following content analysis coding and export of structured network 
analysis data from Palantir,74 the data were loaded into ORA75 in order to 
analyze the network both longitudinally and geospatially (spatiotemporally) over a 
period of 27 months (1 month = 1 time period). Longitudinal analysis was 
selected examine and test changes in network resiliency, structure, and 
performance in response to security forces’ modes of intelligence collection and 
targeting over time.  
 
Figure 6.  Network Diagram at Time Perod 1 of 27 (ORA).76  
Recent studies in longitudinal network analysis on dark networks (Carley 
and McCulloh;77 Bakker, Raab and Milward78) have proven effective in delivering 
                                            
74 Palantir Technologies Software, can be purchased for use from the Palantir government 
website: http://www.palantirtech.com/government. 
75 Kathleen M. Carley et al., ORA User’s Guide 2013 (technical report CMU-ISR-13-108) 
(Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, 2013). ORA (Carley 2001-2011) can be downloaded 
for free for noncommercial use from the ORA website: http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/.  
76 Kathleen M. Carley et al., ORA User’s Guide 2013 (technical report CMU-ISR-13-108) 
(Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, 2013). 
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relevant findings and insight in the detection of network change relating to 
exogenous and endogenous pressure (shock). The use of geospatial network 
analysis (multi-mode) was chosen as a result of anecdotal observations that the 
network leadership (N=40) were compelled to geographically disperse to avoid 
targeting and capture due to pressure exerted by security forces. Using the meta-
matrix79 technique within ORA, I conducted spatiotemporal network analysis of 
the observed network over 27 time periods. The resulting network topographic 
metrics produced by the spatiotemporal analysis in ORA provided 27 separate 
observations (time periods) of the network of the network that were included in 
the structured master data set of this study.  
b. Network Topography  
Network topography denotes the overall structure of the network and 
consists of topographical measures used in the analysis and observation of 
network change to endogenous and exogenous factors.80 The measures of 
density (average degree) and centralization (spatial degree centralization) were 
used in order to measure the impact of the independent variables (modes of 
intelligence collection and targeting of the network) on the intervening variable 
(network adaptation to environmental pressure) in order to describe and track 
measures of network adaption over time.  
                                                                                                                                  
77 Ian McCulloh and Kathleen M. Carley. “Detecting Change in Longitudinal Social 
Networks,” Journal of Social Structure 12 (2011): 1–37.  
78 René M Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark 
Network Resilience,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31, no. 1 (2012): 33–62. 
79 Meta-Matrix technique: “The design structure of an organization is the relationship among 
its personnel, knowledge, resources, and tasks entities. These entities and relationships are 
represented by the Meta-Matrix. Measures that take as input a Meta-Matrix are used to analyze 
the structural properties of an organization for potential risk. Kathleen M. Carley et al., ORA 
User’s Guide 2013 (technical report CMU-ISR-13-108) (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon 
University, 2013), iii. 
80 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 403. 
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It is important to note that there are three significant limitations to network 
topography that can potentially skew results: incomplete information leading to 
missing nodes and links, fuzzy boundaries leading to the dilemma of who to 
include within analysis, and the dynamic and changing nature of dark networks. 
These factors make it impossible to achieve a resolute picture of the network at 
any one time.
81
 In order to minimize the impact of these limitations, I ensured that 
the most up to date and inclusive data sets were used for my analysis and I 
employed a whole network perspective in mapping the network’s structure and 
relationships.  
(1) Spatial Degree Centralization. The network topographic metric of 
spatial degree centralization was selected to operationalize the intervening 
variable of my hypothesis. Previous research suggests that increased network 
centralization can serve to magnify the effect of exogenous pressure (shock) on 
a dark network, while more decentralized networks are more effectively 
structured to mitigate the impact of shock (Bakker, Raab and Milward;82 Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt83). By using spatial degree centralization to measure the 
intervening variable (network adaptation to environmental pressure), the path 
analysis model will provide feedback on how network structure impacts network 
performance measured in the dependent variable (attacks per capita). Because 
the spatiotemporal network analysis conducted in ORA produced the metric 
spatial degree centrality scores for each of the network actors,84 it was possible 
to calculate spatial degree centralization. For the purpose of this research, spatial  
 
                                            
81 Malcolm K. Sparrow, “The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An 
Assessment of the Prospects,” Social Networks 13 (1991): 251–274. 
82 René M Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark 
Network Resilience,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31, no. 1 (2012): 33–62. 
83 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar,” in Networks and Netwars (rev.), 
ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 1–25. 
84 The spatial equivalent of degree centrality, degree centrality is the count of the number of 
an actor’s ties. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 399.  
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degree centralization was calculated for the leadership network only (N=40; time 
period 1) using Wasseman and Faust’s 1994 formula for degree centralization.85 
(2) Average Degree. Average degree is defined as the average 
number of ties among all actors in the network.86 It was used as a control 
variable in order to control for the size and density of the network as it changed in 
size over time. With the network changing in size from time period to time period, 
it was important to control for these potentially spurious effects.  
2. Path Analysis 
Path analysis is an extension of multiple regression analysis and is a 
prominent method of statistical analysis first developed by geneticist Sewall 
Wright in 1920. It is used to test the research hypothesis by examining the direct 
and indirect relationships between the dependent variable (response variable) 
and two or more independent variables (explanatory variables).87 Path analysis 
was selected because of the multivariate complexity of the causal model. It also 
tests the magnitude and strength of the effect that each of the independent 
variables have on the Intervening the dependent variables. This analytic 
contribution allows the model to test the comparative strength of both modes of 
intelligence collection and targeting in relation to the resilience and performance 
of the network, which is central to my hypothesis. Path analysis also provides the 
capacity to test direct relationships between variables, control for indirect effects 
(control variables), and decompose effects between variables over time. 
Limitations and weaknesses of path analysis include recursivity and 
                                            
85 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 176.  
86 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 397.  
87 Christy Lleras, “Path Analysis,” in The Encyclopedia of Social Measurement (New York: 
Academic Press, 2005), 25.  
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unidirectional causal flow, which limits causality of the model in one direction and 
limits the model to correlations instead of proving causation.88 
 
Figure 7.  Path Analysis Model and Variables 
In addition to the intervening (spatial degree centralization) and control 
variable (average degree) defined earlier in this section, the path analysis also 
defined the two independent variables as the security forces modes of 
intelligence collection and targeting (HUMINT-IV1 and NTM-IV2). In order to 
control for the delayed effect that each mode of intelligence collection and 
targeting has on the intervening and dependent variables, a lag of one month (1 
time period = 1 month) was calculated for both independent variables. As a result 
of the calculated one-month lag, the overall observations were reduced from 27 
to 26 time periods. Additionally, research on dark network communications 
(Drozdova and Samoilov 2010) also demonstrates that the use of high-tech 
communications increases the networks vulnerability to endogenous pressure 
(shock) and compels dark networks to decentralize and minimize its traceability 
                                            
88 Christy Lleras, “Path Analysis,” in The Encyclopedia of Social Measurement (New York: 
Academic Press, 2005), 29.  
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in order to limit network damage and provide time and space for recovery.89 
Because of this research and specific anecdotal evidence identifying intelligence 
gaps during the targeting of the observed network, the independent variable 2 
(national technical means-IV-2) was formulated with a decomposition effect by 
taking the total number of NTM interdictions during a given time period divided by 
the time period (minus 1 month lag) in which the interdiction occurred in order to 
account for the decomposition path effect over time.  
In order to provide a more sophisticated measure of network performance 
than simple interdictions of the network, the dependent variable was defined to 
account for the network’s performance in relation to security forces’ mode of 
intelligence collection and targeting. The dependent variable (attacks per capita) 
was defined as the total number of attacks divided by the total number of free 
network members during the given time period. The structural equation modeling 
(SEM) function within the statistical software program STATA 1290 was used to 
conduct the path analysis and test the stated hypothesis.  
 
                                            
89 Katya Drozdova and Michael S. Samoilov, “Predictive Analysis of Concealed Social 
Network Activities Based on Communication Technology Choices: Early-Warning Detection of 
Attack Signals from Terrorist Organizations,” Computational and Mathematical Organization 
Theory 16 (2010): 66, DOI: 10.1007/s10588-009-9058-2.  
90 Stata Corp. Stata Statistical Software: Release 12 (College Station, TX: Stata Corp LP, 
2011). 
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IV. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
The final path diagram model (see Figure 8) is virtually unchanged from 
the original hypothesis in Chapter II. The two independent variables, HUMINT 
and NTM, the intervening variable, spatial degree centralization, and the control 
variable, average degree, are unchanged. The dependent variable has been 
modified from the initial model, which used the raw count of interdictions in 
relation to the security forces’ mode(s) of targeting. The final model uses a more 
nuanced metric of network performance: attacks per capita (DV).  
 
Figure 8.  Path Analysis Diagram with Statistics 
Figure 8 provides a diagram of the path analysis model with regression 
output of significant paths. Table 1 provides a tabular summary of the same 
results. The independent and control variables include inset statistics that 
indicate the variable’s mean and variance over time. The causal flow of each of 
the paths and the standard error is for both spatial degree centralization (Int Var) 
and attacks per capita (DV). We consider each of these coefficients in turn. 
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The negative path coefficient from average degree on spatial degree 
centralization of -0.0019 (p-value = 0.00) indicates that average degree is 
inversely associated with spatial degree centralization. This result is consistent 
with Carter Butt’s 2004 finding that degree centralization is a function of average 
degree91 and reinforces the rationale to control for average degree.  
 
Figure 9.  Scatter Plot: HUMINT versus Spatial Degree Centralization  
The positive HUMINT coefficient of 0.00088 (p-value = 0.034) on spatial 
degree centralization indicates that HUMINT Intelligence collection and targeting 
increases the network’s spatial degree centralization. In other words, as HUMINT 
increases, so does spatial degree centralization (see Figure 9), and as we will 
see below, an increase in spatial degree centralization led to a decline in the 
network’s performance (as measured by attacks per capita—see Figure 10). This 
                                            
91 Carter T Butts, “Exact Bounds for Degree Centralization,” Social Network 10 (2006): 283–
296, DOI:10.1016/j.socnet.2005.07.003  
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result is consistent with previous research, which has found that an increase in 
network centralization can have a deleterious impact on performance (Bakker, 
Raab and Milward92). Furthermore, although the path coefficient (-0.0035) from 
HUMINT on attacks per capita is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.320), it is 
negative. And since the lack of statistical significance probably reflects the small 
number of observations,93 the negative coefficient suggests that HUMINT may 
have also directly contributed to a reduction in the network’s performance. Taken 
together these results suggest that HUMINT intelligence collection and targeting 
is vital to development of a security forces’ counterterrorism collection and 
targeting plan. 
Unexpectedly, NTM had a positive effect on attacks per capita (coefficient 
of 0.0032 with a p-value of 0.531), which suggests that NTM may have led to an 
increase the network’s performance, which was not the desired result. On the 
positive side, NTM, like HUMINT, had a positive effect (0.00062 with a p-value of 
0.367) on spatial degree centralization, which as noted above, led to a decrease 
in network performance. To be sure, both effects are statistically insignificant, but 
additional tests suggest that NTM’s effect on spatial degree centralization is 
nevertheless genuine.94 Finally, as noted above, spatial degree centralization 
had a large and negative effect (-1.37 with a p-value of 0.220) on attacks per 
capita. This relationship is captured graphically in Figure 10. Here again, the 
effect is statistically insignificant (0.220), but additional tests suggest that it is 
genuine.95 This finding corresponds with Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s theory on flatter 
networks (lower centralization score) being more capable of achieving greater 
                                            
92 René M Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark 
Network Resilience.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31, no. 1 (2012): 33–62. 
93 Statistical significance is, in part, a function of sample size. As sample size increases, the 
threshold for obtaining statistical significance decreases. Indeed, the same results with a tenfold 
increase in the number of observations (i.e., 260) produced statistically significant effects for all 
path coefficients except NTM’s effect on attacks per capita. 
94 See footnote 2.  
95 See footnote 2.  
 52 
operational success as discussed in the literature review.96 Table 1 provides 
additional detail on the multivariate statistics produced from the path analysis for 
this study and includes the path coefficients, P-values and standard errors for 
both the explanatory and response variables for each of the regressions 
conducted for this analysis (see Table 1). 
 







                                            
96 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar,” in Networks and Netwars (rev.), 
ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 1–25. 
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Table 1.   Path Analysis Statistics 
Path Analysis: (N=26)  
  
Structural Model Spatial Degree Centralization  




Average Degree  






NTM (IV-1)  













0.000 Constant -> Spatial Degree 
Centralization 
  
-0.0035 0.320 HUMINT (IV-1)  
[Lag1] -> Attacks per Capita (0.0036) 
  
0.0032 0.531 NTM (IV-2) 
[Lag1+decay] -> Attacks per Capita (0.0051) 
  
-1.370 0.220 Spatial Degree Centralization -> 
Attacks per Capita (1.120) 
 
 
0.0165 0.000 Constant -> Attacks per Capita 
 
(0.0045) 
Error on Spatial Degree Centralization 0.00000125   
 
(3.46E-7) 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Over the last 30 years, the world has witnessed some of the most 
sophisticated, OPSEC savvy, and well trained terrorist organizations conduct 
spectacular attacks on Western interests both domestically and abroad. Not only 
have they conducted these attacks with near impunity, but they have also evaded 
the consequences of their actions for decades. Men like Osama bin Laden, the 
19 al-Qaeda operatives who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, and the military leader 
of Hezbollah, Imad Mughniyeh, all understood and adapted to the 
counterterrorism capabilities of their state adversaries. These men recognized 
their vulnerabilities to high-tech intelligence collection and targeting and modified 
their actions and communications to low-signature and low-tech communications 
in order to evade detection and capture. In the cases of Osama bin Laden and 
Imad Mughniyeh, they effectively evaded capture for more than a decade before 
being killed.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that an institutionalized organizational bias 
exists within the U.S. military intelligence community towards a reliance on 
national technical means (NTM) intelligence collection and targeting for 
counterterrorism operations. NTM has become the quick fix for military leaders 
who prioritize the preponderance of their intelligence collection plans on NTM 
derived intelligence. The recent advent of cyber security units and new cyber 
occupational specialties indicates that bias will likely only get worse in the coming 
decades unless commanders and intelligence consumers better understand the 
adaptability and resilience of dark networks. Western nations must understand 
and adapt to the strategic interaction between a dark network’s mode(s) of 
communication and their own security forces’ mode of intelligence collection and 
targeting. This genesis of this study grew out of recognition that an institutional 
bias towards NTM exists and that commanders and intelligence consumers must 
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become better educated on the efficacy of each mode of intelligence and 
targeting in order to more effectively target sophisticated and highly adaptable 
dark networks.  
This study’s findings uncovered an association between the mode of 
human intelligence and targeting and the centralization of the observed dark 
network. It confirmed previous research, which argued that highly centralized 
dark networks are more fault intolerant and become increasingly susceptible to 
collapse (Bakker, Raab and Milward;97 Arquilla and Ronfeldt98) when exposed to 
exogenous pressure (shock). Another critical finding was that HUMINT 
intelligence and targeting has an effect on reducing a dark network’s 
performance as measured by the number of attacks per capita. The combination 
of these two findings indicates that HUMINT collection and targeting can be 
effective in increasing the vulnerability (increased centralization) and reducing 
the performance (attacks) of dark networks. 
B. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The implications are clear. The more Western nations skew their 
intelligence collection and targeting plans towards a heavy reliance on national 
technical means intelligence, the more that sophisticated dark networks will rely 
on low-tech communications and low signature activities to conduct their attacks 
and evade capture. As long as commander’s and intelligence consumers 
continue to play lip service to all-source intelligence and ignore the efficacy of 
HUMINT in counterterrorism operations, the more likely they will experience 
intelligence gaps and lulls in targeting of dark networks.   
So how can counterterrorism forces increase the expected utility of 
intelligence collection towards the targeting and interdiction of dark networks? 
                                            
97 René M Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark 
Network Resilience,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31, no. 1 (2012): 33–62. 
98 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar,” in Networks and Netwars (rev.), 
ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 1–25. 
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The recommendations are simple. Commanders must integrate HUMINT into 
balanced all-source intelligence collection plans. Because HUMINT requires time 
to develop and cannot be quickly diverted or created where an intelligence gap 
exists, commander’s must identify terrorist threats early (left of the line, phase 
zero) and develop HUMINT intelligence operations before conflicts or 
counterterrorism campaigns are necessary. Unquestionably, commanders must 
place an early and persistent emphasis on HUMINT source operations in order to 
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1 40 409 
  
0.0122249 0.002194197 0 0 0 5.75 5 0 
2 40 408 0 0 0.0245098 0.002977058 0 1 0 5.75 10 0 
3 40 407 0 0.3333333 0.019656 0.001959514 0 1 0 5.75 7 1 
4 40 402 0 0.25 0.0323383 0.001959514 0 2 0 5.75 13 0 
5 40 402 0 0.4 0.0273632 0.001959514 0 0 0 5.75 7 4 
6 40 401 0 0 0.0124688 0.001959514 0 1 0 5.75 5 0 
7 40 396 0 0.1428571 0.0277778 0.001959514 1 4 1 5.75 9 2 
8 39 384 1 0.5 0.0260417 0.003285846 0 12 0 5.7948718 10 0 
9 36 367 0.5 1.333333 0.0163488 0.004048403 1 17 1 5.5555556 6 0 
10 34 355 1.25 1.7 0.0084507 0.003914489 1 12 1 5.5294118 3 0 
11 31 342 1.5 1.090909 0.0087719 0.004170345 2 11 0 5.6774194 3 0 
12 31 332 2.75 0.9166667 0.0060241 0.004170345 0 10 0 5.6774194 2 0 
13 31 321 1.25 0.7692308 0.0031153 0.002524368 0 11 0 5.6774194 1 0 
14 30 315 0.5 0.7857143 0 0.002917488 0 6 0 5.5333333 0 0 
15 29 308 0.25 0.4 0.0064935 0.007775765 1 7 1 4.7586207 2 0 
16 30 298 1 0.4375 0 0.003353448 1 9 0 5 0 0 
17 30 294 1.5 0.5294118 0.0068027 0.007775862 0 4 0 5 2 0 
18 29 294 0.75 0.2222222 0.0034014 0.00323836 0 0 0 4.7586207 1 0 
19 29 293 0.25 0 0.0102389 0.003681054 1 0 0 4.7586207 2 1 
20 28 293 0 0 0.003413 0.003749846 0 0 0 4.8571429 1 0 
21 28 293 0 0 0.0102389 0.00345755 0 0 0 4.8571429 3 0 
22 28 286 0 0 0.0034965 0.003255231 0 1 0 4.8571429 0 1 
23 28 286 0 0.0434783 0 0.002847151 0 0 0 4.8571429 0 0 
24 28 280 0 0 0 0.002847293 0 6 0 4.8571429 0 0 
25 26 274 0 0.24 0.0072993 0.004261167 1 5 0 3.9230769 2 0 
26 25 272 1 0.1923077 0.0110294 0.007767391 0 2 0 3.84 0 3 
27 24 247 0.5 0.0740741 0.0040486 0.005735771 0 25 0 3.5833333 0 1 
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